Europe’s defence billions, but whose weapons are we buying?

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have done what decades of EU statements could not: create a consensus among European governments that defence can no longer be left to others. But as Europe commits record sums to rearm, the question remains whether the money will build a truly European defence industry, or continue to flow abroad.
The European Commission and the EU’s foreign policy chief set out an ambitious answer last month in their Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030. It calls for Europe to become “2030 ready”, or able to deter threats and act autonomously if necessary.
To get there, the roadmap outlines hundreds of billions of euros in planned spending, various flagship projects – including a European Air Shield, Drone Defence Initiative and Space Shield – and a drive to make at least 55 per cent of all defence procurement European by 2030.
According to the document, EU members have already raised defence budgets from 218 billion euros in 2021 to 343 billion euros in 2024, with a projected 392 billion euros in 2025. Defence investment rose 42 per cent, with 106 billion euros allocated, and procurement of new equipment reached 800 billion.
Yet “less than half of defence equipment is procured within the EU” and non-European suppliers are gaining market share.
Data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, released in September, shows that the share of equipment sourced inside the EU fell sharply, from 62 per cent in 2022 to just 44 per cent today. Purchases from the US, South Korea, Israel, Brazil and the UK have all surged.
Billions at stake
The plan therefore urges member states to “invest more, invest together and invest European”, setting concrete goals including 55 per cent of defence investment to be sourced from the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base by 2030 and 35 per cent of all investments to come through joint procurement rather than fragmented national buys.
Under the Commission’s ReArm Europe agenda, up to 800 billion euros could be mobilised this decade, backed by the SAFE instrument (150 billion euros already subscribed) and a proposed 131 billion euro defence window in the next EU budget. Achieving NATO’s new spending goal of 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035 would add roughly 288 billion euros a year across the bloc.
Belgium’s role remains modest but telling. Brussels plans 34 billion euros in investments by 2034, balancing mostly US-made F-35 jets with joint EU naval and cyber projects. But coordination through the SAFE fund and the future European Defence Industry Programme could finally allow smaller countries to “buy European” without sacrificing speed or capability.
Test ahead
The roadmap challenges member states to match words with contracts and to accept tighter European oversight in return for shared funding. If it succeeds, the EU may at last begin to turn its economic weight into military power. If not, the billions pouring into defence will only deepen dependence on American, Israeli and Asian suppliers.
Can Europe catch up? Efforts such as Germany’s European Sky Shield Initiative and new joint projects on air defence and armoured vehicles show some progress. Yet in sectors like aerospace, US firms still capture nearly 60 per cent of EU contract value.
Unless member states channel more of their record spending into European production lines, the continent’s rearmament may end up strengthening foreign industries more than its own.
| © JANEK SKARZYNSKI / AFP